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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LORI WATERS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
GARTH T. HOWARD and AFTON 
JEAN HOWARD, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code §§78-2a-3(2)(d) and 78-4-11. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1) May a tenant who was known to the landlord but not named 
as a defendant to an unlawful detainer action and never served in 
that action be evicted pursuant to a writ of restitution issued 
against a former tenant without violating the due process clause 
of the Utah or United States Constitutions? 
2) Is a landlord guilty of forcible entry or forcible 
detainer or wrongful eviction of a tenant when he files an 
eviction action against a former tenant only, obtains a writ of 
restitution against that former tenant only but does not have the 
writ executed, then nails shut the doors to the rented dwelling 
and chains off the driveway while aware of the tenancy of the 
current tenant? 
The trial court granted summary judgment finding no due 
* 
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process violation, no jurisdictional defect, no forcible entry or 
detainer and no wrongful eviction. This court should review the 
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Waters, the 
losing party below and resolve doubts or uncertainties about the 
facts in Waters' favor. The trial court's legal conclusions are 
reviewed for correctness. Canfield v. Albertson's, Inc., 200 
U.A.R. 61, 62 (Utah Ct. of App., filed Nov.13, 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code §§ 78-36-1, 7, 10, 12, and 12.3. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action for conversion, forcible entry and detainer, 
wrongful eviction, and other claims was filed by Waters against 
her former landlord, Howard.[R.1-6] The action was set for 
trial. [R.31] On the court's own motion, the landlord's trial 
brief was deemed a motion for summary judgment on the issues of 
forcible entry and detainer and wrongful eviction and granted 
without testimony or affidavits being presented. [R.63-4, 71-75] 
The trial court found that the facts were not in dispute. In 
October, 1988, Waters rented the premises at 1067 East Diamond 
Way, Sandy, Utah, from Krukowskis, who had previously purchased 
the property from Howard on a Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
[R.51, 53] Krukowskis defaulted on their contract with Howard. 
[R.23-27] Howard served an eviction notice on Krukowskis and had 
them served with an unlawful detainer complaint filed in Murray 
Circuit Court [R.44]. Both the eviction notice and the summons 
and complaint were served on Krukowskis at an address different 
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than the Diamond Way address. [R.44] 
Howard spoke with Waters at the premises in early December, 
when she informed him that she had paid rent to Krukowskis. 
[R.72, para.5] Howard and Waters were unable to agree on rental 
terms. [R.49, 72, para.2] Howard obtained a default judgment 
against Krukowskis. [R.72# para.6] Howard also obtained a writ of 
restitution directed against Krukowskis and ordering the removal 
from the premises of "any and all persons claiming an interest in 
the premises through Krukowskis." [R.45] A constable posted the 
writ on the premises.[R.45] Subsequently, Howard attempted to 
remove Waters from the premises as a trespasser.[R.58] When that 
failed, Howard nailed the entrances to the premises shut and 
chained shut the gate to the driveway, denying Waters access to 
the premises [R.59] 
The trial court found that Howard had acted properly in 
excluding Waters from the premises without judicial process 
because she was a mere trespasser not a tenant since her rights 
as a tenant were derivative through Krukowskis [R.73]. The trial 
court further found that not naming Waters as a party in the 
eviction action against Krukowskis was proper and that posting 
the writ of restitution rather than personally serving it was 
proper [R.73-74]. Judgment against Waters dismissing her 
complaint no cause of action on these issues was entered on 
September 23, 1991 [R.76-77]. A notice of appeal was filed but 
subsequently withdrawn.[78-79,81-82]. The remaining issues were 
resolved at a hearing on May 21, 1992 and a final judgment was 
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entered on September 20, 1992 [R.83] The notice of appeal was 
filed on September 29, 1992 [R85]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Howard wrongfully evicted Waters by failing to name her in 
an eviction action he filed against a former tenant or in the 
writ of restitution he obtained even though he knew she was the 
tenant in possession. He then forcibly excluded her from the 
premises, committing forcible entry. The trial court erroneously 
granted Howard summary judgment dismissing Waters' claims. Since 
the writ of restitution procedure was without jurisdiction over 
Waters and since her right to due process under both the state 
and federal constitutions was violated, the trial court erred in 
dismissing her claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. AFTER HOWARD COMMITTED FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER 
BY PHYSICALLY EXCLUDING WATERS FROM THE PREMISES, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING WATERS' COMPLAINT 
Howard never served an eviction notice upon Waters, never 
served her in an eviction action nor caused her to be removed 
from the premises by a sheriff or constable executing a writ of 
restitution, despite his knowledge of her tenancy [R. 63, 72 
paras. 4 and 5]. Instead, Howard "evicted" Waters by nailing the 
doors shut and chaining the driveway [R.68 para.8]. Howard's 
self-help actions excluded Waters from the premises without 
judicial process and constituted forcible entry and detainer. 
Utah Code §78-36-1 prevents landlords from using violence or 
force to retake property rather than proceeding with an eviction 
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action. In Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985), the 
Utah Supreme Court found an action for forcible entry existed 
where an apartment manager removed a tenant's property from the 
premises without judicial process. This case is similar in that 
Waters was locked out and prevented from using her apartment and 
her property by Howard's actions. 
Old Utah cases reach the same conclusion and are still good 
law: self-help evictions of any sort by a landlord are unlawful 
and subject the offending owner to liability both pursuant to the 
forcible entry statute for possession and incidental damages and 
in tort for additional damages. King v. Firm, 285 P.2d 1114, 1118 
(Utah 1955); Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P.2d 100,102 (Utah 1944);and 
Paxton v. Fisher, 45 P.2d 903,906 (Utah 1935). See also# Fowler 
v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah App.1992). The trial court's 
conclusions of law [R. 63-64, 73-4, paras. 1, 4, 5,and 6] and 
judgment sanctioning the forcible entry [R.76,para. 2] are in 
error and should be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SANCTIONING HOWARD'S 
SELF-HELP EVICTION 
Under Utah law "[i]t is unlawful for an owner to willfully 
exclude a tenant from the tenant's premises in any manner except 
by judicial process . . . " Utah Code § 78-36-12. Section 78-36-
12.3(1) defines willful exclusion as "preventing the tenant from 
entering into the premises with intent to deprive the tenant of 
such entry." Here Howard has clearly violated this statute yet 
the trial court explicitly found that plaintiff had no remedy 
against Howard [R. 64, 73, para.5]. This conclusion is erroneous. 
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The rationale behind Utah's law mandating judicial process 
before eviction lies in preventing breaches of the peace brought 
about through self-help. Pentecost v. Harward at 700. Here 
again, the trial court's conclusion that Waters was a trespasser 
and that Howard had some right to physically prevent her from 
entering the premises she had rented is in error [R.64, 73, para. 
4], sanctions just such breaches of the peace and is a serious 
distortion of this frequently articulated state public policy. 
This court should reverse. 
III. HOWARD'S EVICTION OF WATERS WITHOUT NAMING HER IN THE 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE OR IN THE WRIT OF RESTITUTION 
VIOLATED HER RIGHT OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AS 
GUARANTEED BY THE UTAH AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONS. 
Tenants in possession have a due process right to receive 
legal notice before eviction. In Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 
(1982), the U.S. Supreme Court held that by failing to give 
tenants adequate notice of the proceedings against them before 
issuing final orders of eviction, the Kentucky statute deprived 
them of property without due process of law as required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Greene court 
stated: 
[i]n this case, appellees have been deprived of a 
significant interest in property: indeed, of the right 
to continued residence in their homes. . . The 
sufficiency of notice must be tested with reference to 
its ability to inform people of the pendency of the 
proceedings that affect their interests. In arriving 
at this constitutional assessment, we look to the 
realities of the case before us: In determining the 
constitutionality of a procedure established by the 
State to provide notice in a particular class of cases, 
'its effect must be judged in light of its practical 
application . . .' 
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456 U.S. at 451. (emphasis added). In Greene, the summons and 
complaint were posted on the door and never received. Waters did 
not receive notice, but for a different reason - she was not a 
named party. But like the tenants in Greene, Waters was deprived 
of a significant interest in property - the right to continued 
residence in her home - without due process of law. 
The Greene court applied principles of due process 
established in Mullane v. Central Hanover B. & T. Co., 339 U.S. 
306, 313-315 (1949), the landmark case mandating proper notice 
before deprivation of property. The Mullane court stated: 
[t]here can be no doubt that at a minimum [the Due 
Process Clause] requires that deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property by adjudication be preceded by 
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the 
nature of the case. . . . This right to be heard has 
little reality or worth unless one is informed that the 
matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to 
appear or default, acquiesce or contest. . . . An 
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process 
in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is 
notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity 
to present their objections. 
Mullane established federal due process notice standards. 
Waters was not given any such notice. While the trial court found 
that she was aware of the eviction proceeding against Krukowski, 
[R.63, 73 para.3], that court also found that not including her 
in the eviction case or even naming her in the writ of 
restitution was proper [R.74, para.5]. It would have been simple 
for Howard to include her as a party or to amend the complaint 
and add her name since he was surely aware of her identity after 
he met with her but was unable to agree on rental terms [R.72, 
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paras.4, 5]. Instead of taking either of these simple steps, 
Howard proceeded with the eviction suit that named only 
Krukowskis as parties. The trial court erroneously ratified this 
action [R.74, para.5]. 
State courts such as California have applied a similar due 
process analysis to notice, relying on their state constitution's 
clauses as well as the fourteenth amendment. "Possession of a 
tenant is a substantial right....[N]o one, consistent with 
constitutional safeguards, can be deprived of the possession or 
title to property, or any other substantial right, without 
reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard." Mendoza v. Small 
Claims Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, 321 P.2d 9, 12 
(Cal. 1958). 
Relying on Mendoza and Mullane, the California Supreme Court 
found due process violated in a case much like the present one: 
the eviction of a tenant in possession without the inclusion of 
that tenant in the unlawful detainer suit. In Arrieta v. Mahon, 
644 P.2d 1249 (Cal. 1982), the landlord filed an unlawful 
detainer action for nonpayment against only a former co-tenant 
even though the landlord had accepted rent from the other co-
tenant, who remained in possession, for more than eighteen 
months. The first notice the tenant in possession had of the 
action was when the marshall posted the writ ordering her to 
vacate. That court held: 
[n]otice 'reasonably calculated . . . to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections' 
is, of course, an essential element of the right to a 
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hearing. Those who are evicted from their homes 
pursuant to a writ issued against another receive no 
notice or hearing whatever - unless by sheer good 
fortune they discover the pendency of the action and 
are able to block it through an extraordinary remedy. 
Even those that know of the action may not know that 
their own right to possession is in jeopardy if they 
are not named in the writ or accompanying papers. In 
either case, their eviction is manifestly contrary to 
the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of 
the California Constitution. 
644 P.2d at 1253-54 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted) 
(emphasis added). This analysis is of more than passing 
significance given that Utah's eviction statute was copied from 
California. Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P.2d at 103. 
The Arrieta court noted the danger of applying a writ to 
unnamed persons. The court stated: 
[a]s the events which triggered this action prove, an 
unnamed occupant may not discover the existence of the 
unlawful detainer proceeding until the marshall appears 
to put her and her children on the street. Thus, it is 
quite possible that a tenant will be deprived of 
possession before receiving a hearing. 
664 P.2d at 1255. In Utah, just as in California, the right to 
notice and a pre-eviction hearing is clearly established in 
unlawful detainer actions. See Utah Code §§ 78-36-3, 78-36-8, 
78-36-8.5(2)(c), 78-36-9, and 78-36-10. 
Waters was situated similarly to the tenants in Arrieta and, 
like those tenants, was deprived of possession before receiving a 
hearing. The procedural difference in the two cases is not 
significant. There the marshal posted the notice and would have 
carried out the eviction but for a restraining order. Here the 
constable posted the writ of restitution and the landlord 
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physically turned out the tenant. In both cases the tenant was 
removed from the premises by a landlord who knew they resided 
there and chose to ignore their presence and their right by 
invoking legal action solely against a non-resident former 
tenant. The California court found a due process violation. This 
court should also. 
In non-eviction contexts, Utah courts have required adequate 
notice to comply with state constitutional due process 
requirements. For example, in Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 
1214 (Utah 1983), a pro se litigant was advised only two days 
before trial that a "hearing" was actually to be a full trial, 
not advised of his right to request a jury, and not given 
adequate time to prepare a defense. A judgment against him of 
$84,600 was entered. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed, 
finding a violation of due process which has been frequently 
cited. 
The court focused on "basic fairness of procedure" and 
found that to comply with due process, there must be a "hearing" 
which must be "prefaced by timely notice which adequately informs 
the parties of the specific issues they must prepare to meet." 
669 P.2d at 1213, citing State v. Gibbs, 500 P.2d 209 (Idaho, 
1972). This analysis was similar to that used earlier in State in 
the Interest of L.G.W., 638 P.2d 527, 528 (Utah 1981). Here the 
only "notice" to Waters of the eviction was the posted writ of 
restitution [R.45] and there never was a hearing which involved 
her. Certainly this is more egregious than the facts in Nelson. 
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Waters' due process rights were violated; the trial court erred. 
This court followed Nelson and Mullane in W. & G. Co. v. 
Redevelopment Agency, 802 P.2d 755, 762 (Utah App. 1990) in 
analyzing the procedure used to condemn blighted buildings for 
redevelopment: "where notice is ambiguous or inadequate to inform 
a party of the nature of the proceedings against him or her, a 
party is deprived of due process." There this court found that, 
although some hearings were apparently held to determine whether 
downtown property was blighted, the property owners were never 
advised that the hearings could affect them, were led to believe 
the contrary and thus the procedure violated due process. 
In this case, not only was a potentially interested party 
not properly notified or given an opportunity for a hearing, as 
in W. & G. Co., but Waters, a subtenant in possession, was not 
even made a party to a proceeding that effectively extinguished 
her constitutionally protected possession rights. 
IV. THE WRIT OP RESTITUTION WAS VOID AS TO WATERS 
SINCE THE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER WATERS 
BECAUSE SHE WAS NOT A NAMED PARTY. 
The writ of restitution in this case, which the trial court 
upheld as proper, [R. 73-4, paras. 5-6] ordered the removal of 
Krukowskis "along with any and all persons claiming an interest 
in the premises through defendant" [R.45]. The trial court found 
Waters to be a trespasser and found that she held an interest 
only through Krukowskis [R.73, paras.1,2, 4]. The trial court 
dismissed Wafers' unlawful eviction claim in its summary judgment 
order [R.76]. This decision was in error because there was no 
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jurisdiction over Waters in the eviction action, so applying the 
writ to her and sanctioning her eviction in the absence of 
jurisdiction is error. 
The writ of restitution used in this case, [R.45], appears 
to be drafted in compliance with Utah Code §78-36-7(2) yet 
violates Waters' due process rights, both for the reasons 
discussed above and because it purports to extend the 
jurisdiction of the court over a person not served or a party to 
the action. This section states: 
. . . All persons who enter under the tenant after the 
commencement of the action hereunder shall be bound by 
the judgment the same as if they had been made parties 
to the action. 
While there may be a question as to when the action commenced, 
the trial court's conclusions that not naming Waters in the 
action or in the writ and evicting Waters as a tenant holding an 
interest only through Krukowski was proper [R.74] appear to be 
based on this statute. Yet in the absence of any claim of 
jurisdiction, the trial court's conclusions and judgment on this 
issue are erroneous and should be reversed. 
This situation is similar to that in Perkins v. Spencer. 243 
P.2d 446, 449 (Utah 1952). There the trial court found and the 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed that where an unlawful detainer 
action was brought against a husband and wife and only the wife 
was properly served with the notice to quit, the husband was not 
in unlawful detainer, and there was no right of the landlord to 
possession of the premises as against the husband. Howard here 
had no right of possession against Waters. 
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Another similar situation arose in Pease v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 694 P.2d 613, 615-6 (Utah 1984). There the 
Supreme Court reversed an award of worker's compensation benefits 
against one partner of an employer partnership because there had 
been no finding that that person was a partner nor had she been 
notified of the hearing. The court stated: 
Corinne Pease did not receive any notice of the 
hearing to adjudicate Luther Sander's claim. She 
was not an addressee of the notice of hearing sent 
the Commission to Norco, Ray Peasef and Keith Norwood. 
Nor was she listed on Sander's application for a hearing 
either as a partner in Norco or as a statutory 
employer....The order as to Corrine Pease was not valid 
because she had not been personally served and there was no 
basis in the findings for imposing liability on her as 
a partner. 
The decision was based on both the due process violation and the 
lack of jurisdiction. As here, there was simply no way that a 
valid order could be entered against a person never notified of 
the proceedings that would affect her, never served, and never 
even named in the lawsuit. 
This same result is correct even if the argument be made 
that the tenancy is a res and that a lower jurisdictional 
standard is applicable to in rem proceedings. While this was 
discussed and impliedly endorsed in Graham v. Sawava, 632 P.2d 
851 (Utah 1981), it was disavowed in Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 
1269, 1273 n.9 (Utah 1987). In that case, which focused on when 
service on an out of state motorist could be accomplished by 
serving the Utah Secretary of State, the court imposed an 
obligation of making a "diligent effort" to locate an alleged 
nonresident or departed resident motorist defendant before 
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alternative means of service pursuant to the statute would become 
available. But even then, efforts to locate the person against 
whom a judgment was sought were required, they were to be named 
in the lawsuit, and notice attempted. 
Here, by contrast, the procedure used and the statute which 
appears to authorize such action requires no such effort, but 
allows a landlord to merely sue a tenant who is no longer 
residing in the premises and end up with a judgment enforceable 
against another person, a non-party subtenant. Instead, this 
court should impose a similar "diligent effort" standard on 
landlords which would require them to identify and sue the actual 
tenant in possession as well as any other person contractually 
bound. Here Howard knew of Waters' presence in the apartment yet 
failed to name her. 
Since the trial court adopted this logic and found the 
procedure valid and the judgment and writ of restitution 
enforceable against Waters [R. 63, 73-4, paras. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 
6], a greater wrong has been perpetrated here. The trial court 
judgment should be reversed on both due process and 
jurisdictional grounds. 
An old New York case, Fults v. Munro, 95 N.E. 23, 25 
(N.Y.App. 1911), resulted in a finding that a tenant in a similar 
fact scenario had a cause of action against her landlord for 
failing to name her as a party to the proceeding when he knew she 
was in possession. The court found the tenant was not bound by 
the unlawful detainer action and the eviction order was not valid 
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against her. The court found the owner had unlawfully removed 
Fults and awarded Fults treble damages for forcible detainer as 
well as declaring the owner a trespasser. The Fults court 
stated: 
She should have been joined as a party to the 
proceeding, and it was a trespass to dispossess her 
without giving her an opportunity to make her defense. 
. . . She might have paid the rent to protect her 
possession, or she might have taken a valid objection 
to some of the landlord's proceedings. 
Waters similarly should have been joined as a party to the 
eviction proceeding and should have been given an opportunity to 
raise any defenses. Likewise, here the writ was invalid as the 
court had not acquired jurisdiction over Waters. Without adequate 
notice or jurisdiction, any judgment rendered against Waters was 
void and her claims for wrongful eviction and forcible entry 
should not have been dismissed on summary judgment [R.76, para. 
2]. Rather they should have been granted summarily. 
CONCLUSION 
Waters was denied adequate notice and excluded from her 
premises by self-help and without judicial process. Eviction of 
anyone not named in the writ violates their rights to procedural 
due process and was beyond the jurisdiction of the court. When 
the trial court dismissed her forcible entry and wrongful 
eviction claims, it sanctioned these unlawful actions and 
committed error. The trial court's summary judgment dismissing 
Waters' claims should be reversed, summary judgment granted to 
her as to liability and the case remanded for a determination of 
her damages. 
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£ t ^ day of jg^uc^^ DATED this £ L"^ day of jg\Mjc^^\ . 1993 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to: Garth and Afton 
Jean Howard, 4125 South 430 East, Apt. 103, Murray, Utah 84107 on 
this 2.7 day of A&^- \/AA/\ , 1993, postage prepaid. 
\± 
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7S-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who ei-
ther: 
<1) by breaking open doors, windows or other 
parts of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or 
stealth, or by any kind of violence or circum-
stances of terror, enters upon or into any real 
property; or, 
(2) after entering peaceably upon real prop-
erty, turns out by force, threats or menacing con-
duct the party in actual possession. 1953 
78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant. 
(1) No person other than the tenant of the prem-
ises, and subtenant if there is one in the actual occu-
pation of the premises when the action is commenced, 
shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding, 
except as provided in Section 78-38-13, nor shall any 
proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be nonsuited, for 
the nonjoinder of any person who might have been 
made a party defendant; but when it appears that any 
of the parties served with process or appearing in the 
proceedings are guilty, judgment shall be rendered 
against those parties. 
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the prem-
ises in controversy after the service of any notice as 
provided in this chapter, the fact that such notice was 
not served on the subtenant is not a defense to the 
action. All persons who enter under the tenant after 
the commencement of the action shall be bound by 
the judgment the same as if they had been made par-
ties to the action. 
(3) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a nec-
essary party defendant only in an abatement by evic-
tion action for an unlawful drug house as provided in 
Section 78-38-13. 1992 
78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, 
and rent — Immediate enforcement — 
Treble damages. 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or 
upon default. A judgment entered in favor of the 
plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of 
the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful de-
tainer after neglect or failure to perform any condi-
tion or covenant of the lease or agreement under 
which the property is held, or after default in the 
payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the 
forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried 
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall 
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff 
from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defen-
dant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the com-
plaint and proved at trial; 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged un-
lawful detainer is after default in the payment of 
rent; and 
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction 
as provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the de-
fendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the 
damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through 
(2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are 
provided for in the lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after 
default in the payment of the rent, execution upon 
the judgment shall be issued immediately after the 
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may 
be issued and enforced immediately. 1992 
78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial 
process prohibited — Abandoned 
premises excepted. 
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a 
tenant from the tenant's premises in any manner ex-
cept by judicial process, provided, an owner or his 
agent shall not be prevented from removing the con-
tents of the leased premises under Subsection 
78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempt-
ing to rent them at a fair rental value when the ten-
ant has abandoned the premises. 1981 
78-36-12.3. Definitions. 
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the ten-
ant from entering into the premises with intent to 
deprive the tenant of such entry. 
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the prem-
ises and shall also have the same meaning as land-
lord under common law and the statutes of this state. 
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the fol-
lowing situations: 
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that 
he or she will be absent from the premises, and 
the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after 
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence 
other than the presence of the tenant's personal 
property that the tenant is occupying the prem-
ises; or 
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that 
he or she will be absent from the premises, and 
the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the 
tenant's personal property has been removed 
from the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable 
evidence that the tenant is occupying the prem-
ises. 1981 
-- — • / 
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
BY: BRUCE PLENK, #2613 
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-8891 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
3636 Constitutional Blvd., West Valley City, Utah 84119 
LORI WATERS, * 
Plaintiff, * FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
* CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. * 
* 
GARTH T. HOWARD and AFTON * 
HOWARD, * 
* Civil No. 893001449CV 
Defendants. * 
This matter came on for trial on the 12th day of October, 1990 
before the Hon. Paul G.Grant, judge of the above court. Plaintiff 
was present and represented by Bruce Plenk of Utah Legal Services, 
Inc. Defendants were present and represented themselves. The court 
reviewed the file in this matter, heard argument from counsel and 
defendant and requested briefs on the issues raised. Each party 
submitted a brief. The court deemed defendants' brief to be a 
motion for summary judgment on the issue of forcible entry and 
detainer and wrongful eviction. Having reviewed the file in this 
matter and the memoranda of the parties, the court now enters the 
following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 28, 1988, defendants, as sellers, entered into 
a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Randy and Brenda Krukowski as 
buyers to convey real property located at 1067 East Diamond Way, 
Sandy, Utah, 
2. On September 26, 1988, defendants filed an unlawful 
detainer action against Krukowskis, alleging a default in payments 
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract* 
3. in October of 1988, the Krukowskis vacated the premises 
and rented the property to plaintiff. Plaintiff moved into the 
premises and paid rent to the Krukowskis. The Krukowskis were 
served in the unlawful detainer action at another address on 
November 22, 1988. 
4. Plaintiff and Defendant Garth Howard spoke in December 
but were unable to agree on terms for a month to month agreement. 
5. In early December 1988, Defendant Garth Howard came to 
the premises to collect rent from Plaintiff. She stated that she 
had already paid rent for December to the Krukowskis. 
6. On December 5, 1988, a hearing was held on defendants' 
unlawful detainer action against the Krukowskis in Murray Circuit 
Court. Judgment was entered in favor of Howards and against the 
Krukowskis. 
1. On December 19, 1988, a writ of restitution was issued 
against the Krukowskis. On December 20, 1988, Deputy Constable 
Christian posted this writ on the premises. Plaintiff was not named 
in the writ and continued to reside in the premises. On or about 
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December 23, 1988, Defendant Garth Howard accused plaintiff of 
trespass because she continued to reside in the premises. 
8. On January 5, 1989, defendants attempted to remove 
plaintiff from the premises with the aid of a police officer. When 
that failed, defendants denied plaintiff access to her property by 
nailing the building entrances shut and chained shut the gate to 
the driveway. Defendants also seized plaintiff's property. 
9. Plaintiff recovered her property later in January 1989. 
10. Plaintiff brought this action seeking damages for 
forcible entry and detainer, wrongful eviction, and infliction of 
emotional distress. 
From the above FINDINGS OF FACT the Court now enters the 
following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. When defendants were granted a writ of restitution 
against Krukowskis, all of plaintiff's rights in the premises were 
terminated because she only held an interest through Krukowskis. 
2. There was no privity of contract between the parties in 
this action either by written or oral lease. 
3. Plaintiff had notice of the legal proceedings against 
Krukowskis. 
4. In January, 1989, plaintiff was not a tenant but was a 
trespasser and was not entitled to any notice or opportunity for 
hearing before being excluded from the premises. 
5. Plaintiff has no cause of action against defendants for 
exclusion from the premises. Any such claims must be directed 
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against Krukowskis. Defendants' actions in not naming plaintiff 
as a party to the eviction action or to the writ of restitution 
were proper. Service of the writ of restitution by posting was 
also proper. 
6. Defendants' actions of evicting plaintiff as a tenant 
holding interest through Krukowskis were proper. 
7. Defendants' actions in preventing plaintiff from gaining 
access to her property constituted conversion. 
8. Plaintiff is entitled to damages of up to $150, the exact 
amount to be determined at a separate hearing. 
9. This a final order for purposes of appeal under Rule 
54(b), U.R.Civ.p. There is no just reason for further delay in 
this matter. Judgment shall be entered pursuant to these Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
10. Each party to bear their own fees and costs. 
DATED THIS day of , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
PAUL G. GRANT 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to: Garth 
Howard and Afton Jean Howard, 4125 South 430 East Apt 103, Murray, 
UT 84107 on this day of _ J &#£>(* , 1991, 
postage prepaid. 
-6gj*GcL,^ ^aM— 
[A:WATERS.FOF bp5] 
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
BY: BRUCE PLENK, #2613 
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-8891 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
3636 Constitutional Blvd., West Valley City, Utah 84119 
LORI WATERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARTH T. HOWARD and AFTON 
HOWARD, 
Defendants. 
This matter came on for trial on the 12th day of October, 1990 
before the Hon. Paul G. Grant, judge of the above court. Plaintiff 
was present and represented by Bruce Plenk of Utah Legal Services, 
Inc. Defendants were present and represented themselves. 
The Court has previously entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. The Court now enters the following 
JUDGMENT 
1. Plaintiff is awarded damages for defendant's conversion 
of her property, the amount to be determined at a later hearing. 
2. In all other respects, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed 
no cause of action. 
3. This is a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), 
U.R.Civ.P. 
SEP ^ 3 199, 
:V 
* 
* JUDGMENT 
* 
it 
it 
it 
* Civil No. 893001449CV 
4. Each party shall beartheir own £$&$>„ and" Costs. 
DATED THIS ^ O day of *^2pjfc'ffi'*''' ' ***&?* ' 
PAUL G.-^ : 
CIRCUIT C" '^ JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing JUDGMENT to: Garth Howard and Afton Jean Howard, 4125 
South 430 East Apt 103, Murray, UT 84107 on this __£ 
, 1991, postage prepaid. 
&' day of 
^W> fa-Cl ,z-
a:waters . jud bp5 
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
BY: BRUCE PLENK #2613 
124 South Fourth East, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-8891 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
3636 Constitutional Blvd., West Valley City, Utah 84119 
LORI WATERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARTH T. HOWARD and 
AFTON JEAN HOWARD, 
Defendants. 
: ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
: Civil No. 893001449CV 
: Judge William A. Thorne 
This matter came on for trial on October 12, 1990, before the 
Hon. Paul Grant. The Court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and a Judgment on certain of the issues in this case on 
September 23, 1991. A further hearing to resolve the remaining 
issues was held on May 21, 1992, before the Honorable William A. 
Thorne. Plaintiff was present and represented by Eric Mittelstadt 
of Utah Legal Services. Defendants were present and represented 
themselves. The court reviewed the file in this matter, and based 
upon the stipulation of the parties, now enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. Defendants are to pay $50.00 to plaintiff as damages for 
the conversion of plaintiff's property as follows: $10.00 by July 
5, 1992, and $10.00 each month thereafter until the full amount is 
paid. 
2. Payments are to be made to the West Valley Circuit Court. 
i:~ 2 " 1992 
3* If defendants fail to make the $10.00 payments, a 
judgment in favor of plaintiff may be entered for $150.00, less any 
payments already made. 
4. The earlier judgment of September 23, 1991 and this Order 
resolve all issues between the parties in this matter and 
constitute a final judgment. 
DATED this^/tT~ day of J ^ f~i~~^ ^ 1992; 
B¥ THE COURT: 
... -s^*' sfh 
WI&LIAM /A. THORNE / 
WESV VALLEY CIRCUIT COURT jucfeE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER to Garth and Afton Howard, 4125 South 430 East, 
Apt. 103, Murray, Utah 84107 on this ix ~ day of 
J_JJ~Lt / , ? / , 1992, postage prepaid. / 
V < ,' ?, X ->> 
[bp\waters.ord] 
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